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Abstract
The choice of a portfolio of technologies by risk-averse firms is an-
alyzed. Two technologies with random marginal costs are available to
produce a homogeneous good. If the risks associated to the technolo-
gies are correlated firms might invest in a technology with a negative
expected return or conversely might not invest in a technology with
a positive expected return. If the technology with the lower expected
cost is more risky than the other technology this technology can be
driven out of the firms’ portfolio if risks are highly correlated. With
imperfect competition the portfolios of firms are different, and differ-
ence in risk aversion can explain a full specialization of the industry,
the less risk averse firms using the low cost technology and the more
risk averse firms the other one. The framework is used to discuss the
issue of investment in electricity markets.
keywords: risk aversion, investment, technology mix
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1 introduction
In many industries, firms face random output and input prices. The elec-
tricity industry is a particularly striking example, as important uncertainties
surround the prices of fossil fuels and CO2 emissions as well as the sub-
sidy schemes that support renewable energies, the time to build new nuclear
plants, and the cost of efficient coal plants and carbon capture and storage
facilities. These uncertainties are likely to influence the overall supply and
the technology mix chosen by firms, in particularly if these firms are risk-
averse. One issue is whether investment in an efficient technology could be
deterred because of risk and risk-aversion and if so, how this phenomenon
could be linked to industry structure.
In the present paper, the supply of an industry composed of risk-averse
firms is analyzed. There are two technologies available and each firm must
decide how much to produce with each technology. One technology has
a lower expected marginal cost than the other, and, in a sense, is more
efficient. However, the firm could diversify its portfolio by investing in the
other more costly technology to reduce its risk. The influence of correlation
is emphasized. As the supply of a single firm is described, it is shown that
the higher the price the lower the share of the efficient (cheap) technology
in its technology “portfolio” and if risks are sufficiently correlated, the firm
does not invest in the efficient technology, but instead solely invests in the
inefficient one if the output price is large. Thus, risk and risk-aversion can
explain how an efficient technology is driven out of a firm’ portfolio. Industry
equilibrium with price-taking and Cournot competitors is described. With
perfect competition, all firms have the same portfolio of technologies. The
total industry supply is determined by the aggregate risk-aversion of the
industry and the demand function. The risk-aversion of a particular firm
only determines its size, not the composition of its portfolio. The similarity
of all firms’ portfolios is reminiscent of a feature of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model: any investor’s portfolio is a combination of the market portfolio and
a risk-free asset (see Sharpe, 1991, for a nice exposition). With Cournot
competition, it is shown that this feature does not hold, as less risk-averse
firms are not only larger but also more efficient. The relation of this work
with the general literature is first reviewed, and then the case of technology
choices in electricity markets is further discussed.
The assumption of profit maximizing and risk-neutral firms is central to
the Arrow-Debreu economy. However, several theoretical reasons could be
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advanced to explain that firms act as if they were risk-averse (see Banal-
Estanol and Ottaviani, 2006, for a review) and several empirical studies sup-
port such claims.1 Risk-aversion is likely to play a crucial role when the firm
must make long-term decisions, such as investment choice. The influence of
risk-aversion on a firm’s production decisions has been analyzed in numer-
ous contexts and several authors have analyzed the influence of output price
uncertainty on a competitive risk-averse firm’s production (Dhrymes, 1964;
McCall, 1967; Baron, 1970; Sandmo, 1971).2 The main conclusions are that
the more risk-averse the firm, the less it produces, and a risk-averse firm
produces less as uncertainty increases.
With random input prices, Stewart (1978) shows that a risk-averse firm
over-invests in riskless factors.3 Input price risks have also been analyzed
by Blair (1974) and Okuguchi (1977), but none of these analysis address
the issue of technological diversification and they all neglect an important
consequence of correlation between input prices that is central to the present
analysis. Without correlation, the profit of a firm is negatively correlated
with an input price. This correlation explains that the firm tends to under-
invest in a risky input–i.e. the marginal productivity of this input is lower
than the ratio of the expected input price and the output price. This result
is not generally true if correlations are considered. If the price of an input is
negatively correlated with the price of another it is possible that the profit
be negatively correlated with one price implying an over-investment in the
corresponding input.
In electricity markets, the existence of a technology mix is fundamen-
1For instance risk-aversion can explain corporate hedging activity (Amihud and Lev,
1981; Nance et al., 1993; May, 1995), and Wolak and Kolstad (1991) have empirically
investigated how risk-aversion explains the choices of risky coal suppliers by japanese
firms.
2Appelbaum and Katz (1986) and Haruna (1996) studied long-run industry equilib-
rium. Bradburd (1980a,b) considered the production choices of a risk-averse conglomer-
ate. The assumption of firms risk-aversion has also been used to analyze the use by firms
of financial futures and option contracts (McKinnon, 1967; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981;
Moschini and Lapan, 1995) and vertical integration (Hirshleifer, 1988; Aı¨d et al., 2011).
The monopoly situation has been analyzed by Baron (1971) and Leland (1972). Strategic
interactions have received attention more recently, notably by Tessitore (1994), Wambach
(1999), Asplund (2002) and Banal-Estanol and Ottaviani (2006).
3Batra and Ullah (1974) analyzes how the uncertainty on output price influence the
choice of inputs, however if the output quantity is chosen before uncertainty is resolved
uncertainty has only an indirect effect on input choices (Holthausen, 1976; Mayer, 1978).
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tally related to demand variability and the difference in the cost structures
of technologies Green (2006). This issue is not considered here. The model
constructed in this study, when used to think about an electricity market,
should be interpreted as describing competition for base-load production.
The issue is not the anticipated and well-known time variability of demand
but the implications of producers being risk-averse toward their choice of
base-load units. Risk and risk-aversion are considered as one possible expla-
nations for a potential lack of investment in total capacity or in a particular
kind of technology in an electricity market.
Neuhoff and De Vries (2004) provided a formal analysis of the influence
of risk and producers risk-aversion on their investment choice with a single
technology. Concerning the technology mix, the use of financial portfolio
techniques (Markowitz, 1952) to evaluate the diversification of power pro-
ducing utilities was first used in the ‘regulated era’ and was initiated by
Bar-Lev and Katz (1976) to evaluate the mix of fossil fuels of regulated elec-
tricity utilities. Such a formal analysis has also been used by several authors
to evaluate national portfolios (Humphreys and McClain, 1998; Awerbuch,
2000; Awerbuch and Berger, 2003; Jansen et al., 2006). Roques et al. (2008)
used this approach to evaluate firms’ investment decisions and determined
the efficiency frontier (expected return versus variance) of portfolios com-
prised of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), coal and nuclear plants; they
established that the positive correlation between electricity and gas prices fa-
vors investment in CCGT. This issue is of particular interest given that the
technology of CCGT was one of the driver of electricity liberalization (Green
and Newbery, 1992; Newbery, 1998) and that nuclear is considered to play a
key role in the future generation mix (EPACT, 2005; Department for Busi-
ness, 1993) although producers seem reluctant to invest in this technology
(Department for Business, 1993; Finon and Roques, 2008). Fan et al. (2010)
and Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) used numerical simulation of an electric-
ity industry equilibrium to assess the influence of generators’ risk-aversion on
the total capacity built and on the technology mix.4 They consider several
sources of uncertainty among which the CO2 regulation.
The present paper offers a formal analysis of the determinants of the
portfolio of a risk-averse firm, and, analyzes formally the industry equilib-
4Most studies of technologies portfolio in electricity markets either at the country or
the firm level, consider a fixed aggregate quantity of capacity (expressed in Watt) and
determine the portfolio of technologies that maximize return subject to a constraint on
standard deviation.
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rium under perfect and imperfect competition. The generality of the analysis
allows to consider numerous relevant situations among which the case of a
positive correlation between electricity price and CCGT cost. One may be
skeptical about the importance of risk-aversion and hedging as major de-
terminants of investment choice and particularly as possible deterrents of
investment in specific technologies (e.g. nuclear or renewable) as, a priori,
risk is a second order phenomenon, compared to expected costs and prices.
However, risk and correlation could play a significant role and it is shown
in this study that, even without any technical non-convexities (decreasing
return to scale, minimal size, startup cost etc...) if firms are risk averse, risk
could theoretically disqualify an efficient technology. Furthermore, the indus-
try equilibrium is analyzed and it is shown that if competition is perfect all
firms have the same portfolio of technologies, although less risk-averse firms
produce more than others. This result contradicts the empirical observation
in the EU where firms have different technology mixes (D.G.Competition,
2007). However, if competition is imperfect, it is shown that the portfolio
of firms differ, the less risk-averse firms are not only bigger but also more
efficient. At equilibrium, it is possible that big firms specialize in the efficient
technology while small firms specialize in the inefficient one. This special-
ization is endogenous and not assumed, big firms are not big because they
have a privileged access to the efficient technology (as it is the case in Me-
unier, 2010), but, because they are less risk-averse. And small firms are not
prevented from using the efficient technology because of some fixed cost but
solely because of risks and their risk-aversion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the
model is introduced. The model if then used to analyze first the supply of a
single firm (Section 3) and then the market equilibrium with either perfect
competition or Cournot competition (Section 4). Finally, the framework is
used to discuss the specific issues of the choice between nuclear and gas
(Section 5). Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model developed is quadratic: marginal costs are constant with respect
to production, uncertainty is additive and each firm’s objective is represented
by a mean-variance utility function. A good, sold at a price p, could be
produced with two technologies labeled t = 1, 2 with marginal cost: ct + θt,
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where θt are random variables with Eθt = 0. Standard deviations are denoted
by σt for t = 1, 2, covariance by σ12 and the correlation by ρ = σ12/σ1σ2, it
is between -1 and 1 as σ12 6 σ1σ2. It is assumed that the random variables
are not perfectly correlated, i.e. ρ 6= −1, 1. When t is used to denote one of
the technology s is used for the other s, t = 1, 2 and s 6= t. The expected
marginal cost of technology 1 is assumed lower than the expected marginal
cost of technology 2, c1 < c2 and thus this technology is called “efficient” and
technology 2 “inefficient”. A risk-neutral industry would only use technology
1 and produce a quantity that would equalize the price with the expected
cost of technology 1. With a slight abuse of language, a portfolio is qualified
as more efficient the larger is its share of technology 1.
The good is produced by an industry consisting of a set I of n firms. The
production of firm i in I is denoted by qi, which is the sum of its production
with technology 1, qi1, and technology 2, q
i
2. The demand side is represented
by the price function p(Q), where Q is the aggregate quantity produced by
all firms:
Q =
∑
i∈I
qi =
∑
i∈I
[
qi1 + q
i
2
]
. (1)
This price function is continuous and decreasing, and it is positive and twice
differentiable for Q in [0, Q¯], with Q¯ > 0 and null for Q > Q¯. It satisfies the
following condition :
∀Q ∈ [0, Q¯], P ′′ + P ′Q > 0 (A)
This last assumption, which is common in the industrial organization litera-
ture, implies that the marginal revenue of a firm is decreasing with respect
to the production of its rival. Thus, quantities are strategic substitutes, and
the existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibria are ensured if firms have
convex costs. It is equivalent to assume that functions x → p′(x + y)x are
decreasing for all y.
For i in I the profit of firm i is as follows:
pii(p, qi1, q
i
2, θ1, θ2) = pq
i − (c1 + θ1)qi1 − (c2 + θ2)qi2. (2)
The firm is assumed to maximize a mean-variance utility function where
λi > 0 represents its risk aversion:
U(p, qi1, q
i
2) = Epii −
λi
2
var(pii) (3)
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The risk is only represented by the variance of the firm’s profit, and the firm’s
risk-aversion measures how the firm weights the variance compared to the
expected profit.
With the timing used, quantities are better interpreted as quantities of
producing plants with the implicit assumption that once a firm has invested
in plants it produces at full capacity in all states. With this interpretation,
marginal costs are long term marginal costs that comprise both fixed capacity
costs and variable production costs. Issues related to plant flexibility and the
ratio between capacity costs and variable costs are not considered. Note that
it is also implicitly assumed that the firm can borrow capital at a risk-free
rate.
Output price risk is not explicitly introduced, but, thanks to the additiv-
ity of the framework, one can consider that it is included in marginal cost
risks θ1 and θ2. Output price risk could explain a positive correlation be-
tween the random variables θ1 and θ2. This aspect will be further discuss
when applying the framework to the choice between nuclear and CCGT in an
electricity markets. Furthermore, the random variables represented risks but
they could also be interpreted as representing the time variability of costs or
output price over the life of the plant. In such case, the firm is assumed to be
averse to profit variability. Both phenomena, randomness and variability, are
generally simultaneously at stake, and they surely are not equivalent from
the firm’s perspective. Such distinctions are not considered here.
3 The supply curve
In this section, the supply of a single price-taking firm is described, the
subscript i is dropped to alleviate notations. The firm chooses the quantity
of each technology to maximize (3). At an interior solution, the marginal
increase of expected profit is equalized with the marginal increase of weighted
variance for each technology:
p− ct = λ
2
∂
∂qt
var(pi), t = 1, 2. (4)
The right-hand side is the effect of an increase of production on the variance
of the firm’s profit. With independently distributed risks, this term is positive
for all production and null if production is null. These two features could be
reversed with correlated risks. First, if risks are negatively correlated, the
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variance of profit could decrease with respect to production with a technology.
If the firm produces a strictly positive quantity with a particular technology,
(e.g. technology 1), then an increase of production with another technology
(e.g. technology 2) can reduce the overall risk faced by the firm because the
specific risk of technology 2 is negatively correlated with the risk of technology
1. Thus, production with technology 2 is used to hedge production with
technology 1. One consequence is that it is possible that the firm invests in a
technology even if the output price is lower than the expected marginal cost
of this technology (cf Proposition 1 below).
Second, the right–hand side of (4) is not necessarily null at zero. If costs
are positively correlated, the marginal effect of production on variance is
strictly positive even at zero if the firm produces a strictly positive quantity
with the other technology. In such a case, it is possible that the firm does
not invest in a technology even if the price is above the expected marginal
cost of that technology (cf Propositions 2 and 3).
If the firm invests in both technologies, quantities satisfy the pair of first
order conditions, from (4):
p− ct = λ
(
σ2t qt + σ12qs
)
= λσ2t
(
qt + ρ
σs
σt
qs
)
, t = 1, 2. (5)
The second term of the right-hand side represents the effect of correlation.5 If
costs are positively correlated, the production with one technology decreases
with respect to the production of the other technology, while the price is
maintained fixed. This is so because an increase of production with one
technology increases the risk faced by the other technology production. This
relation is reversed if marginal costs are negatively correlated.
The supply of the firm and the share of each technology depends on the
value of the variances and the correlation of the marginal costs. Several cases
should be distinguished whether the covariance is smaller than none or one
of the variances and whether it is positive.6 Before distinguishing those cases
a general characteristic of the technology portfolio could be established.
5For the reader familiar with the Capital Asset Pricing Market (Sharpe, 1964) these
first order conditions translates into
p− ct = λcov(θt,−pi) = λvar(pi)βt
where βt = cov(θt,−pi)/var(pi).
6It is not possible that the covariance be larger than both variances because 2σ12 ≤
σ21 + σ
2
2 .
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Lemma 1 The share of the efficient technology, q1/q, decreases with respect
to the output price.
When the output price increases, whatever the precise characteristics of
the distribution of random components, the firm increases its total produc-
tion and progressively invests in an increasing share of the inefficient tech-
nology for hedging purposes.
To precisely analyze the composition of the mix, two threshold prices are
worth introducing:
p1 =
σ2c1 − ρσ1c2
σ2 − ρσ1 , and p2 =
σ1c2 − ρσ2c1
σ1 − ρσ2 . (6)
These prices are derived (cf appendix A) from expressions of the solutions
of equations (5). The price pt nullifies the expression of the production with
technology t. The precise composition of the firm’s supply depends on the
characteristics of the distributions of the risks and three cases should be
distinguished.
Proposition 1 If ρ ≤ min {σ1/σ2, σ2/σ1}, then:
• for p < p2, the firm only invests in technology 1, q2 = 0;
• for p ≥ p2, the firm invests in both technologies and both quantities
increases with respect to the output price.
Furthermore, the threshold price p2 at which the firm starts investing in tech-
nology 2 is lower than its expected marginal cost if and only if risks are
negatively correlated, i.e.
p2 < c2 ⇔ σ12 < 0.
The proof is in appendix A. For a small output price, the firm only
invests in the efficient technology, while for a larger one the firm diversifies
its technology portfolio by investing in the second technology. The price at
which the firm starts investing in the inefficient technology is lower than its
expected cost if costs are negatively correlated. In that case, to reduce its
risk, the firm invests in a technology that is not only inefficient but that also
has an expected cost below the output price. Such situation occurs if and only
if technology risks are negatively correlated. Without such correlation there
9
is the usual result that the firm invests only if expected return is strictly
positive. However, with positive correlation the threshold price is higher
than the expected cost which means that there is a range of prices that are
strictly larger than the expected cost of the technology 2 but that do not
trigger investment in that technology.
Proposition 2 If ρ > σ2/σ1 then σ1 > σ2 and p2 < p1 and:
• for c1 ≤ p ≤ p2 the firm only invests in technology 1, q2 = 0;
• for p2 ≤ p ≤ p1 the firm invests in both technologies;
• for p1 ≤ p the firm only invests in technology 2.
The proof is in appendix A. When the risk associated with the efficient
technology is greater than the risk associated with the inefficient one and the
correlation between both technologies is sufficiently important, the technol-
ogy mix of the firm changes dramatically as the price increases. The supply
curve of the firm is depicted on Figure 1. For a small price, the firm in-
vests only in the efficient technology. It then starts investing in the second
technology, and it progressively increases the quantity invested in this tech-
nology while decreasing the quantity invested in the efficient technology up
to the point where for sufficiently large prices the firm only invests in the
inefficient technology. When the price is large, not only does the firm invest
in an inefficient technology, but it completely stops investing in the efficient
one. In such a case, risk explains that an efficient technology is driven out
of the firm’s portfolio. Because of the positive correlation between the two
technologies, the risk associated with the efficient technology is magnified
and investing in this technology is not worth because it increases the risk
associated with the other kind of plants. Even very high expected returns
on the efficient technology plants cannot justify investing in this technology
because of portfolio effects.
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qc2
p1
p2
p
q1>0, q2=0
q1>0, q2>0
q1=0, q2>0
Figure 1: The supply curve with ρ > σ2/σ1.
Proposition 3 If σ1 < σ2 and ρ > σ1/σ2 then the firm only invests in
technology 1 for any price above c1.
The proof is in appendix A. If the risk associated with the inefficient
technology is large and both risks are highly correlated, the firm only invests
in the efficient technology whatever the output price. It is the conjunction of
the two features–high variance and high correlation– that explains why diver-
sification into the inefficient technology is not interesting because investing
in this technology increases the risk faced by the efficient plants.
Correlation plays a critical role on the supply curve and technological
mix of the firm. Let us now investigate the consequences of a change of
correlation. For any given couple of quantities, an increase of correlation
increases the aggregate risk and also the marginal effect of each technology
on that risk. However, there are cross effects that should be investigated
before concluding a negative effect of correlation on investment. Correlation
has a non-null effect only if both technologies are used. In such a situation,
from equations (5) the effect of a marginal increase of correlation is as follows:
∂qt
∂ρ
= −σs
σt
qs − ρσs
σt
∂qs
∂ρ
(7)
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where there is a direct negative effect related to the increase of risk and
an indirect one due to substitution among technologies. If the correlation
is positive,a decrease of the quantity of technology 2 is compensated by an
increase of technology 1. From 7 the portfolio modification is:
∂qt
∂ρ
=
1
1− ρ2
[
−σs
σt
qs + ρqt
]
(8)
The first term represents the direct negative effect of correlation and the
second term represents the indirect cross effect. When the correlation is
negative this cross effect is negative and both quantities decreases but when
the correlation is positive, the overall effect is ambiguous. The consequence
on the total production is as follows:
∂q
∂ρ
=
1
1− ρ2
[(
ρ− σ1
σ2
)
q1 +
(
ρ− σ2
σ1
)
q2
]
. (9)
This could be positive only in the situation described by proposition 2. When
both the risk associated to technology 1 and correlation are sufficiently im-
portant, there is a range of prices where q1 is sufficiently small and q2 is
sufficiently large for this expression to be negative. Therefore, even though
correlation increases both the variance of the firm’s profit and the effect of
productions on this variance, the total production might increase when corre-
lation increases. However, the increase of the total production only happens
for a small set of parameters values; in other cases, the intuitive result that
production decreases with correlation holds.
4 Market equilibrium
Perfect competition
If firms are price takers, the equilibrium price clears the market so that supply
equals demand. Given the linearity of the model, a well-known property of
the CAPM (Sharpe, 1991) is satisfied in the present framework: for any given
price, the coefficient of risk aversion of a firm does not influence the com-
position of its portfolio but only the total quantity it produces. Therefore,
for a given price, all firms choose similar portfolios but differ with respect to
their total production.
12
With price-taking firms the total supply of the n firms is similar to the
supply of a single producer with risk aversion Λ defined by
Λ =
[∑
i∈I
(1/λi)
]−1
. (10)
This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the aggregate risk aversion
of all firms. Each firm i’s investment in a technology represents a share Λ/λi
of the total quantity invested in the sector. Alternatively said, the sectoral
technology portfolio is optimal for each firm, that is, ‘optimal’ in the sense
that it maximizes the firm’s utility 3.
Any entry of a new firm in the industry is equivalent to a reduction of
the sectoral risk-aversion parameter Λ. It is as if the supply side became
less risk averse. For a given price, a change of the risk-aversion parameter
does not affect the composition of the portfolio but rather the aggregate
quantity supplied. With an endogenous price, this change of supply modifies
the portfolio indirectly via the output price.
Corollary 1 An increase in the number of firms or a decrease of a firm’s
risk-aversion decreases the output price and increases the share of the efficient
technology in each firm’s portfolio and in the total portfolio.
Though the result of this corollary is intuitive, the mechanism behind it
is not. An increase in the number firms (a decrease of the industry risk-
aversion) does not directly correct the mix toward the efficient technology
but indirectly via a reduction of the output price. When the number of firms
grows the portfolio converges toward the efficient one, Q∗2 = 0 and p(Q
∗
1) = c1,
because the output price converges toward the marginal cost of the efficient
technology.
Imperfect Competition
With imperfect competition, each firm is able to anticipate the effect of its
investment or production choice on the price. Each firm i ∈ I maximizes
U(p(Q), qi1, q
i
2). At equilibrium each firm’s supply satisfies the following two
first order conditions:
p+ p′qi = ct +
λi
2
∂
∂qit
var(pii), for t = 1, 2, i ∈ I (11)
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Compared to the perfectly competitive outcome, each firm faces a different
marginal revenue at equilibrium. The marginal revenue of a firm is lower the
larger its market share. Accordingly, given the total production, and the less
risk-averse a firm is, the more it produces. Therefore, firms with lower risk
aversion not only produce more but also face lower marginal revenues, and
from Lemma 1, their portfolio is more efficient.
Proposition 4 For i, j ∈ I,
λi 6 λj if and only if qi > qj and q
i
1
qi
> q
j
1
qj
.
The proof is in Appendix B. Contrary to perfect competition, with im-
perfect competition the firms’ investment choices are different with respect
to more than just their size. The less risk averse firms produce more, and
facing a lower marginal revenue, thier portfolios are more efficient.
Corollary 2 For i ∈ I, a decrease of λi has the following consequences:
(i) it increases the production of firm i;
(ii) it reduces the production of all other firms;
(iii) it increases the share of the efficient technology in each firm’s portfolio;
(iv) it increases or decreases the share of the efficient technology in the
overall portfolio.
The portfolio of a firm is a function of the production of its competitors.
The larger this production, the smaller the production of the firm, but the
more efficient its portfolio. With imperfect competition, at equilibrium the
larger firms have more efficient portfolios than their rivals, but an increase
in the production they face, make them smaller and more efficient. The
reduction of the risk-aversion of a firm makes every firm more efficient, but it
has an ambiguous effect on the overall portfolio. It is possible that, following
such a change, even though all firms’ portfolios contain a larger share of
technology 1, the overall portfolio has a lower share of the technology.
Figure 2 illustrates this point in a duopoly with a linear price function
p = 1−Q. There are two firms denoted A and B, firm A is less risk-averse
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than firm B, i.e., λA < λB. If the risk-aversion of firm A decreases, it un-
ambiguously increases the share of technology 1 in the overall portfolio.7 On
the contrary, if the risk-aversion of firm B decreases, it has a non-monotonic
effect on the overall portfolio. Figure 2 represents the evolution of several
relevant variables as the risk-aversion of firm B decreases. In Figure 2(a),
the quantities invested in technologies 1 and 2 and their sum are depicted,
and Figure 2(b) depicts the evolution of the share of technology 1 in each
firm portfolio and in the overall portfolio. As shown in the figures, firm B
becomes less risk-averse, and the share of technology 1 increases in both firms
portfolios; however, its share in the overall portfolio first decreases before in-
creasing. The reduction of the share of technology 1 in the overall portfolio
is due to the reduction of the total production of firm A. Although, the
portfolio of firm A becomes increasingly more composed of technology 1, the
reduction of its total production overcompensates for this change.
0 1ΛA
1ΛB0
QRN
Production
total production
technology 1
technology2
(a) The total production
0 1ΛA
1ΛB0
50%
100%
%
in firm A's mix
in the total mix
in firm B's mix
(b) The share of technology 1 in
the overall mix and in each firm’s
ones.
Figure 2: Evolution of the technology mix in a duopoly as the risk-aversion
of a firm decreases (firm B)
Figure 2 also illustrates the possibility of a full specialization of the in-
dustry with both firms using different technologies. For highly risk-averse
firm B, this firm only uses technology 2 while firm A uses both technologies.
Firm A then specializes in technology 1, while firm B continues to use only
technology 2. Accordingly, the industry is fully specialized, and firms use
different technologies. As firm B becomes less risk-averse, it starts using
7This is true in a duopoly, but not necessarily in an oligopoly. If there more than two
firms, a decrease of the risk-aversion of the less risk-averse firm has an ambiguous effect
in general.
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technology 1, and, eventually, it, too, specializes in technology 1. It is dif-
ficult and fastidious to find analytical conditions, even with a linear price
function, that are necessary and sufficient for firms to use different technolo-
gies. However, we do know that the conditions of Proposition 2 should be
satisfied for full specialization, and it is possible to get a sufficient condition
in the general case.
Corollary 3 If ρ > σ2/σ1, and, if the price with a risk-neutral monopoly
is larger than p1, then, there are λ
A and λB, with λA < λB, such that in a
duopoly I = {A,B} both firms produce a strictly positive quantity, and firm
A (resp. B) only uses technology 1 (resp. 2).
If the price with a risk-neutral monopoly is larger than the threshold price
p1, then for small λ
A, a monopoly with a risk-aversion λA results in a price
that is also larger than p1. This ensures that for a large λ
B, firm B will be
sufficiently small such that its marginal revenue is above p2, and the firm is
specialized. It is always feasible to calibrate a price function that satisfies
this condition.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion on the effect of the en-
try of firms. In the perfectly competitive setup the entry of a new firm is
equivalent to the reduction of the risk-aversion of one firm. With imperfect
competition, this is also true and ambiguities, like those describes above,
can arise. Whereas the entry of a firm increases the total production and the
share of the efficient technology in each firm portfolio, its effect on the overall
portfolio is ambiguous if firms’ risk-aversions are sufficiently heterogeneous.
For instance, if there is one firm with a low risk-aversion, firm A, that is fac-
ing nB more risk-averse rivals that are identical, an increase in the number
of these competitors has an effect qualitatively similar to the reduction of
the risk-aversion of firm B in the previous example. With sufficiently het-
erogeneous firms, the large firm is initially in a position of monopoly and it
produces using both technologies. As risk-averse competitors start entering
the industry, they are first specialized in technology 2.Although, these initial
entries make firm A increases the share of technology 1 in its portfolio, they
reduce the share of technology 1 in the aggregate mix. Thus, the share of
the efficient technology in the industry portfolio is U-shaped, and eventually
goes to 1.
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5 Nuclear versus gas
The framework could be specified to suit the issue of investment in nuclear
and CCGT plants in an electricity market. Our simple model does not ac-
count for plant flexibility, that is, the possibility for a producer to reduce or
stop its production if the price of electricity is low. This flexibility explains
that even without any risk consideration there is an optimal technology mix
to produce electricity for a variable or random consumer surplus.8 Our anal-
ysis is better interpreted as a competition between base-load technologies,
i.e., technologies used to produced throughout the entire year.
The price of electricity, the cost of a nuclear plant and the cost of CCGT
are all random. The risks associated with the cost of a nuclear plant is
relatively specific and unrelated to the risks associated with the electric-
ity and gas prices; in particular, these risks concern investment and O&M
(operation and maintenance) costs. The former are well illustrated by the
frequent revisions in the cost the EPR (European, or Evolutionary, Pressur-
ized Reactor), a new and complex technology. Other existing technologies
are more mastered and not subject to a similar uncertainty. However, the
earthquake and the following Tsunami in Japan and their effects on the re-
actors in Fukushima induced a likely change in the O&M costs for all world
wide existing reactors due to more stringent safety regulations. Furthermore,
the uncertainty surrounding the life span of plants and the costs of their de-
commissioning can also be viewed as a risk associated to the annualized cost
of nuclear power production. Concerning CCGT, the two most important
components of these risks come from the uncertainty surrounding the price
of gas and the uncertainty surrounding the price of CO2 emissions. Roques
et al. (2008) consider that the cost of CCGT is positively correlated with
the price of electricity. Several reasons can explain this positive correlation.
First, if the variable cost of CCGT plants determines the price of electricity
the majority of the time, these are naturally correlated. Given that, in the
present framework, it is assumed that capacity is always fully used it is not
the variable cost of new plants that could determine the electricity price but
possibly the variable cost of less efficient gas plants previously built. Sec-
ond, the demand for electricity and the demand for gas both are linked to
the same fundamental variables, such as weather. And third, the positive
8The composition of this mix and its relation to electricity pricing has been analyzed
in the so called “peak-load pricing” literature (see Crew et al., 1995, for a review) and
recently reformulated in the context of competition by Joskow and Tirole (2007).
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correlation can also be because electricity and gas are substitutable inputs
for households and industries.
Let us denote cn + n and cg + g as the random costs of a nuclear plant
and a CCGT, respectively. The price of electricity is also assumed random:
p + . Thus, compared to the previous framework, if nuclear is more (resp.
less) efficient than CCGT, it corresponds to technology 1 (resp. 2) and
CCGT to technology 2 (resp. 1), and random components are θ1 = n − 
(resp. θ2 = n − ) and θ2 =  − g (resp. θ1 =  − g). The uncertainty
surrounding the price of electricity is formally equivalent, given the linearity
of the framework, to an uncertainty surrounding both technologies’ costs. It
is assumed that the risk associated to nuclear is not correlated to electricity
prices and CCGT cost:
cov(n, ) = 0 and cov(n, eg) = 0 (12)
With this transposition of the framework, the variances associated with each
technology are the following:
var(n − ) = var() + var(n) (13)
var(g − ) = var() + var(g)− 2cov(, g) (14)
and the covariance of these risks are the following:
cov(θ1, θ2) = cov(n − , g − ) = var()− cov(, g). (15)
The price uncertainty induces a positive correlation between technologies’
returns. This correlation between the returns of technologies is decreasing
with respect to the correlation between the price of gas and the price of
electricity.
Corollary 4 If cn < cg and cov(, g) ≥ var(g), then for a large expected
electricity price, p > p1, a price-taking firm only invests in CCGT. The
threshold price p1 is
p1 =
(var()− cov(, g)) cg − (var(g) + var()− 2cov(, g)) cn
cov(, g)− var(g) (16)
If the correlation between gas and electricity prices is sufficiently strong,
firms do not invest in nuclear even if it is the most efficient technology.
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The condition on the risks depends only on the covariance between CCGT
cost and electricity prices and the variance of the CCGT cost. The risk
associated with the nuclear technology does not intervene in this condition.
The threshold does not depend on the nuclear risk either. Thus, if an industry
is in the configuration described by the Lemma, it is fully specialized in gas,
and a reduction of the risk associated to nuclear power would not modify the
industry equilibrium.
The effect of a change of the nuclear risk var(n), has interesting conse-
quences. Such a change is depicted in Figure 3(a) for the situation described
by the Lemma cn < cg and cov(, g) > var(eg) and a fixed price between
p2 and p1. For such a price, the industry is diversified and invests in both
technologies. As evidenced, an increase in the variability of the nuclear cost
induces a reduction of the investment into nuclear plant and a rise in the
investment into CCGTs. The latter change dominates and the overall effect
on the industry supply is positive. This surprising result is due to the cor-
relation between gas and electricity prices. If this correlation is greater than
the variance of the gas price, then any reduction of the nuclear production in-
duces an overcompensating increase in CCGT production (see the first order
condition 5).
A second surprising consequence of the condition of Corollary 4 relates
to the effects of a change to the cost of nuclear plants. These effects are
depicted in Figure 3(b), for a fixed expected electricity price above cg. For a
small nuclear cost, the industry is fully specialized into nuclear production,
and its supply is decreasing with respect to the nuclear cost until it becomes
diversified when p1 = Ep. From this point, the nuclear production decreases
and the gas production increases sufficiently to ensure an increase of the total
production. Finally, for for large nuclear cost, the industry specializes into
gas and the cost of nuclear plants no longer influences the supply.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the supply for a fixed price as a function of the
characteristic of nuclear technology
Figure 3 is obtained with specific values of parameters and a given price.
However, the results of comparative static could be obtained with a general
cost function.
Corollary 5 If cov(g, ) > var(), and, if the equilibrium price is strictly
between p1 and p2, then, either an increase of the marginal cost of nuclear cn,
or an increase of the risk associated to nuclear var(n), induces an increase
of the total production and a decrease of the price of electricity.
It is difficult to draw policy recommendations from this analysis given that
no market failures have been identified. If the risk-aversion behavior of firms
were related to a market failure, correcting this market failure could enhance
the welfare. However, it may be optimal that firms behave in a risk-averse
fashion. For instance, if there are transactions costs that explain markets
incompleteness, to “complete” markets by regulation may be too costly and
inefficient. However, the analysis could still help to understand the conse-
quences of regulations targeted to help firms invest in nuclear plants. The
analysis provides a double-edged argument. On the one hand, the analysis
shows that risk can theoretically explain that firms do not invest in nuclear
plants even though it is the most efficient technology. It then seems justi-
fied to help nuclear technology. On the other hand, if conditions are met
for the first result to hold, a regulation that either reduces the cost or the
risk of the nuclear technology can have unexpected adverse consequences.
As stated by Corollary such policies could reduce the overall investment in
power producing plants.
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6 Conclusion
In this article, the technology portfolio of an industry of risk-averse producers
has been analyzed in depth. The influence of correlation between technologies
risks has been particularly stressed. It has been shown that this correlation
has a crucial influence on the equilibrium portfolio of firms. In particular,
this correlation can deter firms from investing in an efficient technology and
explain the full specialization of an industry in an inefficient (i.e. with a
larger expected marginal cost) technology.
Furthermore, the analysis of the market equilibrium under perfect com-
petition reveals that all price-taking firms have the same portfolio, but they
differ with respect to their size. Furthermore, the more firms there are the
larger the share of the efficient technology into each firm and into the industry
portfolio. These results are deeply modified with imperfect competition. In
particular, with imperfect competition firms with different risk-aversion have
different portfolios and, theoretically, risk-aversion can explain that each firm
is specialize into one technology. Additionally, even though a reduction in
the risk-aversion of one firm increases the share of the efficient technology in
each firm portfolio, it can possibly reduce the share of this technology in the
overall portfolio.
The analysis was then used to discuss the choice between nuclear and
CCGTs for base-load production in an electricity market. If the cost of
CCGT and electricity prices are sufficiently correlated, the previous results
apply. If nuclear technology were cheaper than CCGTs risk could neverthe-
less explain a full specialization of the industry in CCGTs. Furthermore, the
effect of the nuclear risk and expected costs are surprising, as an increase of
any of these quantities can induce an increase in the industry’s total produc-
tion.
A Supply curve
Preliminary results
The two first order conditions (4) can be written:
λ
[
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
] [
q1
q2
]
=
[
p− c1
p− c2
]
(17)
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Let denote x1 and x2 the solutions of these equations without positivity
constraints: [
x1
x2
]
=
1
λ∆
[
(σ22 − σ12) (p− c1) + σ12 (c2 − c1)
(σ21 − σ12) (p− c1)− σ21 (c2 − c1)
]
(18)
where,
∆ = σ21σ
2
2 − σ212 = σ21σ22
(
1− ρ2) . (19)
The thresholds prices p1 and p2 in (6) respectively nullify x1 and x2. Two
useful expressions of these prices are:
p1 = c1 − ρσ1
σ2 − ρσ1 (c2 − c1) and p2 = c1 +
σ1
σ1 − ρσ2 (c2 − c1). (20)
If (q1, q2) maximizes the firm’s profit subject to the constraints qt > 0 for
t = 1, 2, then for p > c1 the following equivalences hold (from the first order
conditions of the constrained maximization):
q2 = 0⇔ x2 ≤ 0, and, q1 = 0⇔ p ≥ c2 and x1 ≤ 0
. Thus,
Lemma 2 The quantities q1(p, λ) and q2(p, λ) that maximizes the firm’s ob-
jective (3) are:
• if x2 ≤ 0 then q2 = 0 and q1 = (p− c1)/(λσ21);
• if x2 ≥ 0 and x1 ≤ 0 then q1 = 0 and q2 = (p− c2)/(λσ22);
• if x1 > 0 and x2 > 0 then q1 = x1 and q2 = x2.
Proof of lemma 1
Let us show that q1(p, λ)/ (q1(p, λ) + q2(p, λ)) is increasing with respect to
p. This function if continuous and differentiable by parts because q1 and q2
are. For p > c1 three situations can arise, either both quantities are strictly
positive or only one of them. In the latter case the share of technology 1 is
constant w.r.t. p (it is either 1 or 0). In the former case the two first order
conditions 4 are satisfied and both quantities are equal to x1 and x2. Taking
the derivative of the equations 18 gives
22
[
∂q1/∂p
∂q2/∂p
]
=
1
λ∆
[
σ22 − σ12
σ21 − σ12
]
(21)
And the sign of the derivative of the share of technology 1 in the firmr’s
portfolio is the sign of (the numerator of its derivative):
∂q1
∂p
q2 − ∂q2
∂p
q1 (22)
which is equal to (from 18 and 21 and the expression of ∆ 19):
1
(λ∆)2
[(
σ22 − σ12
)
(−σ21)−
(
σ21 − σ12
)
σ12
]
=
1
λ2
> 0. (23)
Proof of Proposition 1
If ρ < min {σ1/σ2, σ2, σ1} then:
• p1 < p2:
– if ρ ≥ 0 then from (20) p1 < c1 < p2;
– if ρ < 0 then, (−ρ)(σ1−ρσ2) < σ2−ρσ1 because ρ2 < 1, and from
(20), using ρ < 0, p1 < p2.
• xt, for t = 1, 2, is increasing with respect to p because σ2t > σ12;
Then, for p ∈ (c1, p2], x2 ≤ 0 so q2=0 and q1 > 0 by Lemma 2; for p ≥ p2
then p ≥ p1 so x1 > 0 and qt = xt for t = 1, 2 and both quantities increase as
the price increases. Furthermore, from (6) p2 = c2 + ρ(c2 − c1)σ2/(σ1 − ρσ2)
so p2 < c2 if and only if ρ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
If ρ > σ2/σ1 then σ2 < σ1 because ρ < 1. And, from 6
• p2 < p1: ρ(σ1 − ρσ2) > ρσ1 − σ2) because 0 < ρ < 1; then, p2 < p1
from the expressions (20) of p1 and p2 and because σ1 − ρσ2 > 0 and
ρσ1 − σ2 > 0.
• the proposition follows from the application of Lemma 2.
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Proof of Proposition 3
If ρ > σ1/σ2 then σ1 < σ2 and x2 < 0 for any p larger than c1 from (18) and
by Lemma 2 the firm only invests in technology 1.
B Market Equilibrium
Let us introduce a new notation to ease the exposition, Φ(p) is the total
production of a firm with risk aversion 1 facing a price p:
Φ(p) = q1(p, 1) + q2(p, 1). (24)
This function is increasing with respect to p:
Φ′ =
1
∆
[
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12
]
> 0.
Proof of Corollary 1
the quantity produced with each technology by a price-taking firm facing
price p, with risk aversion λ are q1(p, λ) and q2(p, λ). From Lemma 2 these
functions satisfies:
qt(p, λ) =
1
λ
qt(p, 1) for t = 1, 2 (25)
At the industry level, for any price p the supply of the industry with tech-
nology t = 1, 2 is:
Qt =
∑
i∈I
qt(p, λ
i) = qt(p, 1)
∑
i∈I
1
λi
=
1
Λ
qt(p, 1) = qt(p,Λ) (26)
At the market equilibrium, the price p∗ satisfies:
p∗ = P (q1(p∗,Λ) + q2(p∗,Λ)) = P (Φ(p∗)/Λ). (27)
taking the derivative w.r.t. Λ:
∂p∗
∂Λ
= −P
′
Λ2
Φ +
P ′
Λ
Φ′
∂p∗
∂Λ
(28)
Then, the sum Φ is increasing with respect to p (from 21), P ′ is negative,
so, p∗ is increasing with respect to Λ.
24
A reduction of the risk aversion of one firm or the entry of a new firm are
both equivalent to a reduction of Λ and induce a reduction of the equilibrium
price. From Lemma 1, the share of technology 1 increases in each firm
portfolio and in the industry portfolio.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let us first show that there is a unique Cournot equilibrium. Let us denote
R(Q, λ) the (unique) solution of the equation:
R =
1
λ
Φ(P (Q) + P ′(Q)R) (29)
the solution of this equation is unique because the right hand side is contin-
uous and decreasing w.r.t. R. R(Q, λ) is the production of a firm with risk-
aversion λ when total production is Q. This function is decreasing w.r.t to Q
because the right hand side is decreasing w.r.t. Q (because P ′ + P ′′R < 0).
It is differentiable by part and
∂R
∂Q
= −Φ
′
λ
(P ′ + P ′′R) +
Φ′
λ
P ′
∂R
∂Q
(30)
At a Cournot equilibrium the total production Q and each firm production
qi satisfy qi = R(Q, λi). The total Cournot production is the solution of the
equation:
Q =
∑
i∈I
R(Q, λi). (31)
This equation as a unique solution (the R.H.S. is decreasing), so the Cournot
equilibrium is unique: each firm’s production are the unique solutions of
qi = R(Q, λi) (32)
qit = qt(P + P
′qi, λi) =
1
λi
qt(P + P
′qi, 1) (33)
The function R(Q, λ) is striclty decreasing w.r.t. λ when positive (by
differentiation of 29). So,
λi 6 λj ⇔ qi > qj (34)
Then, let us show that
λi 6 λj ⇒ q
i
1
qi
> q
j
1
qj
(35)
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We proceed by contradiction and assume that there are two firms i, j ∈ I,
i 6= j such that λi < λj and qi1/qi < qj1/qj. By Lemma 1 q1(p, 1)/Φ(p)
is increasing w.r.t. to p, so (by 33) P + P ′qi > P + P ′qj and qi < qj a
contradiction.
The Proposition follows from 34 and 35.
Proof of Corollary 2
We consider a decrease of the risk aversion of firm i ∈ I. The cournot
equilibrium production is the solution of
Q =
∑
j∈I
R(Q, λj). (36)
a decrease of λi increase the right-hand-side for all Q, so the total production
increases. We prove the three first points of the Corollary
• For firm j 6= i, its production R(Q, λj) decreases because R decreases
w.r.t. Q (point (ii)).
• Concerning firm i, its production increases because the total production
increases and all other firms production decreases (point(i)).
• The marginal revenue of all firms decreases:
– for firm i, P (Q) + P ′(Q)qi decreases because Q and qi increases,
– for firm j 6= i, P (Q) + P ′(Q)qj decreases because qj decreases
and qj = Φ(P + P ′qj)/λj, and λj remains unchanged and Φ is
decreasing.
So, from Lemma 1, the share of technology 1 in all firms portfolio
increases (point(iii)).
C Nuclear versus Gas
Proof of Corollary 4
Corollary 4 is an application of Proposition 2. If cn < cg then nuclear corre-
sponds to technology 1 in the general framework, and cov(, g) ≥ var(g) is
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equivalent to ρ ≥ σ2/σ1:
ρ =
cov(n − , g − e)
[var(n − )var(eg − e)]1/2 =
cov(n − , g − e)
var(n − )
[var(en − e)]1/2
[var(eg − e)]1/2 .
ρ ≥ σ2
σ1
⇔ cov(n − , g − e)
var(n − ) ≥ 1
⇔ cov(n − , g − e) ≥ var(n − )
⇔ cov′(, g) ≥ var(g) from (15) and (13)
Then, by plugging the expressions 13, 14 and 15 into the expression of
the threshold p1 6 its expression is as follows:
p1 =
(var()− cov(, g)) cg − (var(g) + var()− 2cov(, g)) cn
cov(, g)− var(g) . (37)
Proof of Corollary 5
If cn < cg, nuclear corresponds to technology 1 and CCGT to technology 2
in the general framework. An increase of cn corresponds to an increase of c1
and an increase of var(n) corresponds to an increase of σ1 with σ12 being
constant (ρ decreases). We prove that the total production is increasing with
respect to c1 and σ1 in the general framework. It will prove the corollary.
In the general framework, if both technologies are used, at equilibrium
the quantities are Qt(p, c1, σ1) for t = 1, 2 given by the equations 18 with the
industry aggregate risk aversion Λ.
• For a fixed price, an increase of c1 has the following effects (differenti-
ating 18) :
∂Q1
∂c1
=
−σ22
Λ∆
and
∂Q2
∂c1
=
σ12
Λ∆
and σ12 ≥ σ22 (because cov(, g) ≥ var(g)), therefore, the total pro-
duction increases with respect to c1. Thus, the equilibrium production
increases and the market price decreases following an increase of c1.
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• Concerning the effect of an increase of σ1, it is easier to start from the
firs-order conditions 17, differentiating these equations gives:
Λ
[
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
] [
∂Q1/∂σ1
∂Q2/∂σ1
]
=
[ −2ΛQ1
0
]
(38)
Then, [
∂Q1/∂σ1
∂Q2/∂σ1
]
=
2Q1
∆
[ −σ22
σ12
]
. (39)
Therefore, for a given price, the aggregate production is increasing with
respect to σ1 (because σ12 > σ
2
2). Consequently, the equilibrium price
is decreasing and the equilibrium quantity is increasing with respect to
σ1.
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